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Eugenio Proto  
 
Growth expectations and banking system fragility 







Tässä tutkimuksessa haetaan selitystä havaintoon, jonka mukaan pankkikriisien toden-
näköisyys näyttää olevan suurempi nopean talouskasvun maissa. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen 
malli perustuu Diamondin ja Dybvigin tunnettuun malliin, jossa pankit tarjoavat kulutta-
jille vakuutuksen kulutuksen vaihteluita vastaan. Mallin tuloksien mukaan nopea odotettu 
kasvu nostaa optimaalisen likviditeettivakuutuksen tasoa, vaikka tämä lisäisikin talletus-
paon mahdollisuutta. Empiiriset tulokset tukevat tätä hypoteesia. Talletuskorkojen vaikutus 
pankkikriisin todennäköisyyteen on suurempi pitkän nousukauden jälkeen. Julkisen vallan 
toimet – kuten pankkien pelastaminen tai talletusvakuutus – ovat mallissa tehokkaita, 













The likelihood of a banking crisis appears to be higher in fast-developing countries. An
explanation is provided in a Diamond and Dybvig framework, where banks are vehicles of
consumption-smoothing, oﬀering insurance against shocks to the consumption path of con-
sumers. The theoretical model shows that the higher consumer growth expectations, the
higher the optimal level of illiquidity insurance — even if it implies higher exposure bank runs.
Empirical evidence supports this result and suggests that the eﬀect of deposit interest rates
on the probability of crisis is stronger after a period of high, uniterrupted growth. Policies
of providing bail-outs or deposit insurance are demonstrated to be eﬃcient even when they
increase the fragility of the banking system.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Banking panics were frequent phenomena in the developing economies of nineteenth century
Europe and the United States.1 Modernly, bank crises have tended to be associated with emerging
economies. Several studies, using various deﬁnitions for banking crisis, ﬁnd that at least 70% of
banking crises in the last quarter century occurred in developing countries.2 Interestingly, banking
∗I thank Wiji Arulampalam, Mathias Dewatripont, Marcelo Fernandes, Patrick Legros, Andrew F. Newman,
Carlo Perroni, Oved Yosha, Luca Sala, and Philippe Weil for helpful comments and advice. My appreciation also
extends to the seminar participants at Venice (EEA 2002), Warwick (RES 2003), University of Helsinki, BOFIT
(Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition), Ente Einaudi, and Royal Holloway. Finally, I wish to
thank the BOFIT for ﬁnancial support. The usual disclaimers apply.
†University of Warwick, Department of Economics; email: e.proto@warwick.ac.uk.
1See e.g. Kindleberger (2000).
2Londgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Caprio and Kilinger (1999), Demirguç-Kunt
and Detragiache (1998a, 1998b, 2002).
1crises tend to hit fast-growing economies with increasing frequency as the number of years of
uninterrupted high growth rises (see Table 1).
We argue this pattern in developing countries is linked to growth expectations stoked by years
of consistent good economic performance. In actuality, growth for such countries during this
period of economic “take-oﬀ” is highly unpredictable; the economy is still poorly diversiﬁed and
an exogenous negative shock can easily hamper or halt the development process (Acemoglu and
Zilibotti 1997). This pattern suggests individuals form high expectations for the future after
observing a period of continuous, uninterrupted growth. Starting from this simple notion, we
develop a theoretical explanation of the link between growth and fragility as presented in Table
1 and demonstrate that high growth expectations lead agents to prefer deposit contracts with a
higher risk of bank run.
Table 1. Frequencies of crisis in countries with diﬀering growth records, 1986-993
Years of previous growth > 5%
#Crisis
#Obs. # Observations
fewer than 2 .032 1736
2, 3 or 4 .052 77
5o rm o r e .111 27
all observations .034 1840
At a more detailed level, it appears individuals smooth their consumption path by increasing
their demand for liquidity when growth expectations increase, even if this implies greater exposure
to ﬁnancial crises. The macroeconomic literature analyzes consumption-smoothing with respect
to fully predicted consumption needs.4 Using the same logic, we can also posit that a rational
individual might desire to smooth her random consumption needs and demand a higher level
of insurance against “illiquidity shocks” as her future income expectations rise. In the model
devised by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (henceforth DD model), banks provide an insurance
against illiquidity shocks by investing some of depositors’ liquid capital in long-term assets. In
a competitive market, banks meet the higher demand for illiquidity insurance by oﬀering higher
interest rates on deposits. In doing so, they also increase their short-term liabilities and become
more vulnerable to crisis.
3Crisis data are elaborated from Caprio and Kligebiel (1999), and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996). Growth
rates are from World Bank’s WDI database. Years of ongoing crisis are excluded. In the empirical section, we
provide a more detailed description of the dataset.
4See e.g. Blachard and Fisher (1989), pp. 275-300.
2We empirically test our ﬁndings using the econometric model developed by Demirguç-Kunt
and Detragiache (1998, 1999, 2002) for measuring the determinants of ﬁnancial crisis. We show
that the real interest rate on deposits increases, more than elsewhere, the probability of crisis in
countries characterized by years of high, uninterrupted growth .
Most papers applying the DD model deal with diﬀerentiating between real-shock-driven and
sunspot-driven bank runs or identifying real-shock-driven runs.5 Here, we focus on real-shock-
induced crises and determine the external conditions that increase the exposure of banking systems
to real shocks.6 The modeling features of the paper are to some extent similar to Allen and Gale
(1998), who consider an optimal deposit contract in the situation where a real signal can trigger a
generalized run. The Allen-Gale model (AG model) ﬁnds that a bank run may produce an eﬃcient
result when a bank’s portfolio is perfectly illiquid. We start by assuming that early liquidation is
costly, but possible, and then analyze the eﬀect of economic fundamentals on the likelihood of a
ﬁnancial crisis.7
Chang and Velasco (2001) utilize a DD-based model to explain the ﬁnancial crises of the mid-
1990s. They focus on the role of short-term international capital ﬂows in increasing the fragility
of a banking system with respect to a sunspot-driven bank run. While the Chang-Velasco (CV)
model represents a powerful tool in explaining currency crises and their connection to banking
crises, it lacks general empirical support in considering purely banking crises.8 Moreover, it fails
to provide a clear link between past growth and ﬁnancial crises.
Ennis and Keister (2003) analyze the link between growth and ﬁnancial crisis in a DD frame-
work, emphasizing the impact of bank runs on economic growth to determine the social costs of
ﬁnancial crisis over the long term. Here, we consider the ﬂip side of this eﬀect (i.e. the impact of
5Gorton (1987), Chiari and Jaganathan (1988), Jacklin and Battacharya (1988), Goldstain and Pauzner (1999),
Gren and Li (2000), and Peck and Shell (2003). See Freixas and Rochet (1999) and the more recent Gorton and
Winton (2002) for excellent surveys on the argument.
6The fact that bank run are triggered by real shock rather than by sunspot, like in the original DD model, seems
supported by the empirical literature. Gorton and Winton (2002) in their recent survey on ﬁnancial intermediaries
mention a number of empirical papers and conclude (page 77): "The previous evidence about the organization of
the banking system strongly suggest that, at least hystorically, there is not necessary a link between banks and
panics".
7The AG model assume all agents can be treated equally in case of a run, while in our model we speciﬁcally
account for the ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served constraint, whereby the ﬁr s tc u s t o m e r sm a k i n gi tt ot h ec o u n t e ra r ea b l et o
withdraw more money. This adds an element of ineﬃciency to the bank run, because individuals face a non-insurable
risk of arriving late at the counter.
8See the empirical evidence in the last section, Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), and Eichengreen and
Arteta (2000).
3growth on ﬁnancial crisis) to determine underlying causes.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we analyze the main model with the
simplifying assumptions that early asset liquidation, while costly, yields exactly the initial capital.
In section 3, we provide an empirical test of the previous results. In section 4, we consider the
eﬀects of lowering asset liquidation costs. We draw our conclusions in section 5.
2 The model
We now present a model of banking along the lines of the DD model. Additionally, drawing on
the AG model, we assume asset revenue is random and that a bank run can be generated by a
bad real signal. Individuals take into account the risk of a bank run ex ante and consider the
trade-oﬀ that occurs as increased liquidity increases the risk of a bank run.
In our model economy, there is a continuum of agents with mass 1 and a single good that can
be consumed or invested. Every agent owns a unit of endowment at t =0and lives for three
periods. The good can be costlessly stored or invested in an illiquid investment. This investment
consists of a share of the market portfolio, which we assume is perfectly correlated with the
aggregate production in the economy. A unit invested at time 0 yields Rh after two periods with
probability q and Rl with probability 1−q, where Rl <R h. If agents perceive that the economy
is on a path of high growth, q is close to 1. Conversely, q is close to 0 in a stagnating economy.
We deﬁne ˜ R as the random variable describing the returns on portfolio with E( ˆ R) > 1.T w o
possible outcomes are indicated with the vector R ≡ (Rl,R h).
To simplify, we assume that a unit of the capital invested at time 0 can be disinvested and
yields exactly a unit of the good at time 1. Under this simplifying assumption, it is optimal at
t =0to invest the entire wealth in the illiquid asset. (In section 4, we analyze the eﬀect of the
asset’s liquidation costs and allow for the asset to be sold on the secondary ﬁnancial market at a
price p.)
The performance of the economy at time 2 is public knowledge at time 1, after the agent
receives a perfect signal about the state of the economy. At time 0, since all agents are the same and
have the same information about economic fundamentals, they have identical growth expectations.
Accordingly, individuals decide on their optimal consumption path c∗
1 and c∗
2, knowing R and q.
There are two types of individuals: “patient” and “impatient.” Every individual knows their
types only at time 1, while at time 0 each individual knows that she will be impatient with a
probability of 1
2. An impatient individual obtains no utility in consuming at t =2 , so her utility
is
uI(c1,c 2)=u(c1).
4Otherwise, a patient individual gets her utility from consuming at time 2. Moreover, given






u(c1) c1 >c 2,
u(c2) c1 ≤ c2.
As usual, function u(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. We





This is a standard assumption in the DD model; it ensures that individuals are willing to ad-
equately insure themselves against a liquidity shock, so that c∗
1 > 1.9 For our purposes, it is





Put in this way, we see that assumption (1) implies a preference to translate part of the
increase in expected returns at time 2 into time 1 consumption. Therefore — and this is crucial
for our model — individuals prefer a smoother consumption path. Higher expected returns in the
long run always translate into higher short-term consumption rather than into higher long-run
investment (i.e. the income eﬀect outweighs the substitution eﬀect). In the following discussion,
we will see that the beneﬁt to individuals of a smoother consumption path comes at the cost of
greater exposure to ﬁnancial crisis.
2.1 The standard deposit contract
Following DD, a bank can increase the utility of individuals as it can insure them against an
idiosyncratic illiquidity shock. A demand deposit contract can provide this insurance. However,
the demand deposit contract is not always risk-free, since R is random and there is the risk of
a bank run in certain circumstances.10 Following Allen and Gale’s insight that the realization
of ˜ R is known at time t =1 , we assume that the signal about the economy is not contractible.
Otherwise, a contract contingent on R would always avoid an information-induced bank run and
9It is possible to show that condition (1) corresponds to the assumption that cu
0(c) is decreasing.
10S i n c et h e r ea r em u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i ai nt h em o d e l ,ab a n kr u nw i l lb ep o s s i b l ef o ra n yv a l u e so fR. Here, however,
we do not consider pure sunspot-based bank runs.
5achieve the ﬁrst-best insurance.11
T h es t a n d a r dd e p o s i tc o n t r a c tp r o m i s e saﬁxed payment at each date. The consumption
path is described by (c1,c 2(R)), since the level of c2 necessarily depends on R. As Jacklin and
Battacharia (1988) observe, this is equivalent to a standard deposit contract that promises a
ﬁxed c2 without specifying ex ante c2(Rl). The bank promises c2(Rh) as the normal level, but
individuals know the bank can only pay Rl/Rh of the promised payment in the event of a negative
shock.
Notably, a run does not necessarily follow a bad shock.
The optimal level of c1 is chosen ex ante from the bank knowing the possibility of the run. A
run will not take place when c2 ≥ c1. Thus, patient individuals have the incentive to declare their
own true type and only impatient individuals withdraw at time 1. Given that c2 =( 2− c1)R,





Thus, banks choose (c1,c 2(R)), knowing that a run can take place when condition (2) is true.
In order to determine the optimal deposit contract, we deﬁne ρ as the number of individuals
withdrawing their deposit at time 1 and assume the following timing for the run:
• Individuals observe the realization of ˜ R. If c1 > 2R
R+1, they join the bank run, regardless of
whether they are patient or impatient.




2, there is a bank run and the bank liquidates and distributes its remaining
capital (1 − 1
2c1). We assume the bank does this after formally closing the counter, i.e. all
remaining individuals receive the same amount, 2(1 − 1
2c1).
Intuitively, this sequence of events appears to reﬂect actual bank behavior during a run. Run
are unexpected and it often takes banks several days to fulﬁll the requests of an unexpectedly
large number of withdrawers. Accordingly, banks normally serve the ﬁrst customers arriving at
the counter, but at some point, perhaps when a bank exhausts its cash, the counter closes and the
bank spends the next few days liquidating its assets. At this point, the bank distributes equally
to all the remaining customers the liquidity realized from the asset sales. Alternatively, we may
11An assumption that the signal is perfect is unnecessary, but it is made to keep the exposition as simple as
possible. Naturally, we can more realistically assume that only a share s of individuals receive the signal, but this
leaves the model essentially unchanged as we show in note 13.
6assume that the government decides to suspend convertibility once it is certain a run is taking
place, i.e. if ρ>1
2.12
Since we assume that everybody observes the signal at the same time and runs to the
counter when (2) is true, 1
2 is the probability of being in the ﬁrst 1
2 to arrive at the counter
with other early withdrawers.13 Accordingly, the agents’ utility at time 0, conditional that
the run happens, is 1
2u(c1)+1
2u(2(1 − 1


































(2 − c1)(Rl + r)
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If the contract is bank-run proof, the expected utility from the contract is V rp(r, q).I nc a s eo fa
risky contract, the expected utility is V br(q,r). Since banks are in competition, they maximize
individuals’ utility.
If R = Rh, the fundamental run will never take place. This is intuitive, since a contract where
a bank run happens cannot be optimal in any case. In formal terms, we can state:
Lemma 1 If R = Rh, there is never a bank run.
Proof. Suppose there is a bank run when R = Rh.S i n c ec1 > 2Rh







c1 = c2 =1 ,
but then 1 > 2Rh
Rh+1, or 1 >R h, which is impossible, since E( ˆ R) > 1.
12Although such behavior is realistic, it is not the only possible behavior. For example, a pure sequential service
constraint would bind the bank to serve all customers according to their position in the queue. This would leave
those later in line without anything once the bank exhausts its cash. However, we assume this pattern only to
simplify the algebra of the model. From the economic policy standpoint, what is critical for certain results in the
last section is that early and late withdrawers are not treated similarly, i.e. there is a non-insurable risk of arriving
late.







(1+s) is the probability of being in the ﬁrst
1
2 to arrive at the counter. Since the probability
of being an early withdrawer is
1





7If Rl < 1, it is optimal to liquidate the asset when the realization of ˜ R is low because its
liquidation value is higher than the second-period return. In this case, a bank run always takes
place.14 Perhaps the more interesting case is where Rl > 1 and the bad shock is insuﬃcient to
consistently trigger a run.
To simplify the exposition, we initially solve numerically problem (3) under the CRRA as-
sumption and present the solution in Figure 1. We then state the more general proposition 1.
Using Figure 1, we analyze the optimal contractual choice with respect to diﬀerent levels
of q,f o rag i v e nd i ﬀerence between good and bad state, r. When the q<q
¯
constraint (12) is
not binding, it implies there is only one available contract that solves problem (3) and that the
contract is bank-run proof. When q
¯
≤ q<¯ q (12) is binding and V rp >Vbr, agents prefer a safe
contract and choose c1 = 2Rl
Rl+1.F i n a l l y ,w h e nq>¯ q then V br >Vrp : the expected utility for a
risky contract is so high that agents choose it despite the risk of a bank run.
Accordingly, countries which are on a stable growth path and where individuals expect high
growth with a probability q close to 1 are vulnerable to bank runs. In contrast, countries where
agents are uncertain about the future (a lower q), or countries with stagnating growth (or even
negative growth, if we relax the assumption that the good is non-perishable), with q close to 0,
face no risk of bank runs.
Now, we more generally state:
Proposition 1 For any given diﬀerence Rh − Rl > ¯ r, with ¯ r ﬁnite and positive, there exists a ¯ q




In this section, we test empirically the results of the theoretical model obtained in section 2. In
particular, we establish that high real interest rates on deposits signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability
of ﬁnancial crises, especially for countries that have experienced ﬁve or more years of uninterrupted
14This condition is made more stringent by our assumptions for the liquidability of the initial investment and the
non-perishability of the good. A good perishable at a level of R
l < 1 could also be compatible with a run-proof
contract.
























Figure 1: Deposit Contracts and Risk (σ =2 ,R h =1 .05 ,R l =1 .01)
growth. We use the logit econometric model developed by Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a
and 1998b and 2002) (DKD model) on the determinants of banking crisis.
Consistent with our modelization, we assume that at the beginning year t − 1, individuals in
country i make their decisions on whether to consume at the end of time t − 1 a n dt h ee n do f
time t knowing the inﬂation rates INFi,t−1,the expected real return Re
t, and what an investment
at the beginning of time t−1 w i l ly i e l da tt h ee n do ft i m et. The realization of ˜ R is linked to the
growth rate. We assume that if growth GRt is the larger of a certain threshold, then R = Ry,
otherwise R = Rl.Competitive banks, optimizing individuals’ utility, determine the equilibrium
real deposit rate RDIRi,t−1.
The main problem derives from the determination of expectations for ˜ R (or GR).15 We deal
with this problem, assuming as we argued in the introduction, that at t−1 agents generate their
growth expectations at t as a function of past and current growth rates GRi,t−1−k. We arbitrarily
deﬁne a threshold of 3 percent and a threshold of 5 percent, indexed by j, a n dt h e nd e t e r m i n e
15Realized growth rates are a poor proxy, given that high growth expectations do not always translate into high
growth rates. Moreover, we lose the unexpected shocks, which, according to our model, are the ones that generate







1 if GRi,t−1 >j ,. . .,GR i,t−1−5 >j
0 otherwise
for j = {3;5}.
In other words, RH(j)i,t−1 =1when a country has experienced at least 5 years of uninter-
rupted growth. Therefore, we assume that growth expectations at t − 1 for time t become high,
i.e. q exceeds ¯ q,o n l ya f t e r5 years of uninterrupted high growth.16
3.1 Sample and variables
The diﬃculty of building a reliable dataset for banking crises reﬂects the fact that only a minority
of crises actually result in bank runs. In most cases, governments or external institutions intervene
to avoid the run. Therefore, several criteria need be ﬁxed to distinguish a systemic banking crisis
from an isolated episode of ﬁnancial distress for banks. We follow the DKD model in our deﬁnition
of banking crises, including in our dataset all episodes listed in Caprio and Kingebiel (1999) and
Lingren, Gillian, and Saal (1996) where at least one of the following conditions holds (a complete
list of crises appears in the appendix):
1. An extensive bank run took place or emergency measures were enacted by the government
in response to a crisis.
2. The cost of rescuing the ﬁnancial system was at least 2 percent of GDP.
3. The banks involved collectively controlled over 50% of the credit market.
4. A deep restructuring, such as wide-scale nationalization, took place in the sector.
5. The ratio of non-performing assets over the total assets in the banking system exceeds 30
percent.
From these conditions, we determine a dummy variable Crisisi,t, which takes the value one
when a banking crisis occurs in country i and time t, and 0 otherwise. The years of crisis following
the ﬁrst have been excluded from the sample to avoid problems of endogeneity.17
16In the appendix, we present the sub-sample with RH(3)i,t =1 . Considering 1998 per capita income, this sub-
sample include none of the top ten richest countries and only Ireland makes it into the top 20. Therefore, both for
j =3and j =5 , all observations where RH(j)i,t−1 =1can be rightly said to include only emerging economies.
17Recall that, apart from the growth rate, we already consider the eﬀect of variables t − 1 on a crisis at time t.
Thus, there is no problem of endogeneity for the ﬁrst year of crisis.
10We consider all countries in the World Bank development indicators 2004 (WDI) database
from 1975 to 1999. Since each observation contains a variable lagged up to six years, our sample
is restricted to the period 1981—1999 with gaps from missing data and data for subsequent crisis
years deliberately omitted. We also exclude centrally planned economies, economies in transition,
and countries with inﬂation rates above 200 percent.18 In this way, we are left with 108 countries
and 51 crisis episodes, i.e. a total of 1,389 observations for the regressions in the largest sample
(the list of countries and ﬁnancial crises in our dataset are reported in the appendix).19
Our explanatory variables are: (1) the Real Deposit Interest Rate DIR, which is determined
by subtracting the deposit interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks (IMF’s International
Financial Statistics dataset) from the contemporaneous rate of inﬂation, measured by the change
in the GDP deﬂator (World Bank); and (2) the yearly growth rate of per capita GDP, GR (World
Bank).
Our control variables are: (1) the inﬂation rate, INF, (calculated in terms of GDP deﬂator,
World Bank) to account for central bank monetary policy and macroeconomic mismanagement;
(2) the real interest rate, RIR , deﬁned as the lending interest rate adjusted for inﬂation (IFS),
to control for economic policy on interest rates and for the eﬀect of high interest rates on non-
performing loans rate; (3) the currency devaluation, DEV (IFS) to test whether the crises are
driven by excessive foreign exchange risk exposure (see below for a more detailed description of
the argument); and (4) per capita GDP, (WDI), as a proxy for the quality of bank regulation
and the legal environment.
3.2 Results and robustness
We follow the literature on banking diﬃculties and apply a logit model to estimate the regres-
sions.20 We also introduce a random eﬀect to control for countries’ heterogeneity. These results
are reported in Table 2.
In general, we can see that the parameters of the variables in common with DKD (1998) — the
closest in terms of countries included in our sample — have the same sign and their magnitudes
are comparable.21
18This is true since both interest rates and inﬂation are yearly averages and the interest rates do not adjust
instantaneusly to inﬂation rates, especially at the beginning of the inﬂationary period. The countries excluded for
this reason are Angola, Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Israeal, Liberia, Mongolia, Peru, Somalia and Suriname.
19The period covered is shorter than 18 years for some countries.
20DKD (1998), note 17.
21They are GDP, DEV ,a n dGR.
11In regression 1, the eﬀect of the real deposit interest rate RDIR is positive and signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level, while the dummy RH(3) interacted with DIR is positive and signiﬁcant at
one percent level. Thus, the eﬀect of interest rates on the probability of crisis is always signiﬁcant
and substantially higher in countries that have experienced ﬁve years of uninterrupted growth
at three percent. Furthermore, we note that growth rate GRis negative and highly signiﬁcant,
conﬁrming the notion that a real shock is needed to trigger a crisis.22
To have an idea of the magnitude of the eﬀect of deposit real interest rate on the probability
of crisis, we estimated its elasticity for three countries among the ones that experienced a crisis
after at least 5 years of high growth. For the 1986 crisis in Malaysia a one percent decrease in the
real deposit interest rate would have decreased the probability of crisis of about 32 percent; for
the 1987 crisis in Cameroon a one percent increase of deposit interest rate would have reduced the
probability of crisis of about 21 percent; in the 1997 crisis in South Korea the same negative change
in the deposit interest rate would have lowered the probability of crisis of about 30 percent.23
The signiﬁcativity of RDIR and RH(3)∗DIR is essentially robust to the introduction of
the lending interest rates, RIR, as we can see in regression 2. Moreover, the variable RIR is
not signiﬁcant, which seems to rule out the possibility that the banking crisis might have been
g e n e r a t e db yh i g hl e n d i n gi n t e r e s tr a t e st h r o u g ha ni n c r e a s ei nn o n - p e r f o r m i n gl o a n s . F r o m
regression 3, we observe that the magnitude of RH(3)∗DIR is unaﬀected when we introduce the
dummy RH(3). This dummy is not signiﬁcant in regression 3, but becomes highly signiﬁcant
when introduced alone in regression 4. Regressions 3 and 4 together suggest that the higher
vulnerability of developing countries is entirely related to the high real deposit interest rate.
To verify whether the result is driven solely by the east Asian crisis, we run regression 5 ,
which excludes 1997 and subsequent years. The coeﬃcient of LRDIR is substantially unchanged,
while the magnitude of RH(3)∗RDIR is lower, but still signiﬁcant at 5 percent level. Finally,
in regression 6, we note that the coeﬃcient of RH(5)∗ LRDIR, when the growth threshold
considered is 5 percent instead of 3 percent, is not substantially diﬀerent from RH(3)∗RDIR.
The currency devaluation DEV results are insigniﬁcant, which seems to rule out the external
capital channel as a general determinant of banking crises. If a crisis would had been generated
by an sudden halt in the inﬂow of external capital, the crisis should have been preceded by
a devaluation of the domestic currency. This w o u l dh a v eb e e ng e n e r a t e db yam a s s i v es a l eo f
22Problems of endogeneity may arise in this case, but they are minor given that ﬁnancial crises seriously hit the
economy in subsequent years.
23The total marginal eﬀect
dcrisist
dDIRt−1 has been obtained by adding the marginal eﬀect of DIRt−1 to the marginal
eﬀect of RH(3) ∗ DIRt−1.
12domestic currency either to buy dollars and repay loans denominated in domestic currency or to
liquidate assets denominated in foreign currency.24
24Both DKD (1998) and Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) arrive at a similar result. However, the depreciation
appears positively related to the crisis in DKD (2002).
13Table 2. Deposit interest rates and banking crises
123456
years 1981 − 99 1981 − 99 1981 − 99 1981 − 99 1981 − 96 1981 − 99
Control variables
GDP/CAPt−1 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 -0.041 -0.036 -0.039
(1.65)* (1.68)* (1.65)* (1.87)* -1.62 (1.84)*
Depreciationt−1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(DEVt−1) -0.39 -0.37 -0.38 -0.53 -0.6 -0.44
Inﬂationt−1 0.032 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.031
(INFt−1) (2.90)*** (2.87)*** (2.87)*** (3.09)*** (2.83)*** (2.92)***
Lend. Real Intt−1 -0.018
(RIRt−1) -0.67
Explanatory variables
Growtht -0.094 -0.096 -0.093 -0.093 -0.087 -0.085
(GRt) (3.42)*** (3.46)*** (3.38)*** (3.38)*** (3.15)*** (3.17)***
Dep. Real Intt−1 0.03 0.044 0.03 0.033 0.031 0.031
(DIRt−1) (2.14)** (1.72)* (2.13)** (2.42)** (2.19)** (2.27)**
RH(3)∗DIRt−1 0.295 0.294 0.304 0.209





No. of obs. 1391 1391 1391 1391 1181 1391
N o . o f c r i s e s 5 15 15 15 14 65 1
No. of countries 108 108 108 108 106 108
N X
i=0




Dependent variable Crisisi,t. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
144 Liquidation costs
T h ee x e r c i s eo fc o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c s ,p e r f o r m e di ns e c t i o n2 ,s h o w sh o wa ni n c r e a s ei ng r o w t h
expectations, i.e. an increase in q, can increase the vulnerability of the banking system. In this
section, we analyze the change in costs individuals are expected to bear after a crisis.
Accordingly, we now compare the eﬀects of a bail-out in the event of a crisis and the eﬀect
of deposit insurance against bank runs. Both policies avoid the cost of early liquidation of bank
assets. At the end of this section, we analyze the impact of an eﬃcient secondary market, where
it is possible to sell assets in the event of a bank run, and the resulting reduction in liquidation
costs.
Generally speaking, a reduction of liquidation costs appears to increase the fragility of the
banking system.
4.1 Economic policy
Consider the impact of two diﬀerent policies commonly put in place to deal with ﬁnancial crises.
In the ﬁrst, a government deposit insurance scheme permits a government or central bank to print
money to supply liquidity to the banking system. In the second, troubled banks are bailed out
by an internal agency such as the central bank or an international agency such as the IMF.
In the past section, we considered a standard deposit contract, where c1 is ﬁxed at t =1and
it is not contingent on ˜ R, because the signal is not contractible. Following the argument of the
DD model, a government can always do better by changing c1 by levying a tax on consumptions
or printing money, when it observes the realization of ˜ R. Let us deﬁne ˜ c1(Rl)=c1(1−t(Rl)) and
˜ c2(Rl)=( 2− ˆ c1(Rl))Rl the new level of consumption after the intervention.











u(2 − ˜ c1(R)) ˆ R
´´
. (5)
At the beginning of time 1 if R = Rh or if R = Rl and c1 ≤ 2Rl
Rl+1, the government does not
intervene; (5) is the same as problem (11) and c1 =˜ c1. If R = Rl and c1 > 2Rl










subject to the truth-revelation constraint
u(ˆ c1(Rl)) ≤ u(˜ c2(Rl)), (7)
which satisﬁes the conditions
u0(ˆ c∗
1(Rl)) = Rlu0(˜ c∗
2(Rl)) and ˜ c∗
2(Rl)=( 2− ˜ c∗
1(Rl))Rl.
15From this, we note that (7) is never binding as Rl > 1. Unlike in the past section, the incentive
compatibility constraint (7) is never violated: the government can choose the level of ˜ c1and make
s u r et h a t( 7 )i sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed when ρ = 1
2,i.e. when only impatient depositors withdraw at
t =1 . Accordingly, the government decreases the level of c1 when R = Rl.
We now argue that this mechanism increases the fragility of the system in the sense that banks
incur ﬁnancial distress for a larger interval of q.25 The bank-run-proof contract determined by
sub-problem (11) is always dominated by the risky contract with deposit insurance determined by
problem (5). More formally, if q is such that constraint (14) is binding when there is no insurance,
(i.e. q
¯
≤ q ≤ ¯ q), problem (6) always dominates constrained problem (11). Hence, a risky contract
is always preferred. We illustrate this point using Figure 1: if q>q
¯
the intervention would
be needed any time R = Rl, since the bank-run-proof contract is always dominated. Without
insurance, a risky contract is optimal only if q>¯ q. In this sense, the fragility of the system is
increased.
Now we analyze a bail-out policy, whereby a central agency is committed to acquiring a
troubled bank’s assets, or equivalently, to lending money to a troubled bank using its illiquid
assets as a collateral. To make our argument straightforward, we abstract from considering the
opportunity cost of the funds needed for this operation and assume that they are supplied at no
cost. Thus, this policy is zero-cost, since the agency lends at time 1 an amount 2(1 − 1
2c1)Rl to
the bank, which then completely repays the loan at time 2 when it liquidates assets and realizes
Rl.
Such lending avoids the loss Rl−1 for the bank when it liquidates assets. As a result, c2(Rl)=
2(1 − 1













˜ c1)R.( 9 )
If c1 > 2Rl












and from which we see that c1 > 2Rl
Rl+1 is feasible.
25Here, we cannot talk about a run. Instead, we deﬁne “ﬁnancial distress” as a situation where external inter-
vention is required.
16In this case, the contract determined by problem (11) when (12) is binding and is always
dominated by the contract from problem (8) (they are equivalent when (12) is not binding).
Referring again to Figure 1, this implies that whenever q>q
¯
, a run will take place if R = Rl.
The presence of a bail-out also increases the interval of q when a run takes place. At the same
time, the utility from problem (8) is higher than in problem (3) because the cost Rl−1 is avoided.
Therefore, a bail-out is also eﬃcient even though it increases the fragility of the banking system.
Comparing the deposit insurance policy to the bail-out policy, we note that while the bail-out
policy improves aggregate utility, it is not ﬁrst-best eﬃcient like the deposit insurance. If q>q
¯
and the government commits to bailing out a bank in a crisis, there will always be a bank run
when R = Rl. In this case, late withdrawers are always treated worse than early withdrawers,
since c∗
1 > 2(1 − 1
2c∗
1)Rl. In other words, agents are not insured against the risk of arriving late
to the counter in case of a bank run. The same problem does not arise under a deposit insurance
scheme, since c1 can be changed after the fact.
4.2 The secondary market for bank assets
An eﬀect similar to that of a bail-out policy is generated by an increase in the eﬃciency of
secondary ﬁnancial markets, where banks can sell their assets in the event of a crisis. To analyze
this eﬀect, we relax the assumption that an asset can be liquidated at price 1 and assume that
p 6 Rl is the market price of a bank asset, so that R − p is its liquidation cost. We interpret
ah i g h e rp as an increase in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial market. We see that although a high p
improves the aggregate welfare, it also increases the fragility of the banking system.
For simplicity, assume that p > 1. This ensures, as before, that all the capital will be invested





p (p,q,r)} where (10)
V br















































From problem (10), we derive the following
26The case p<1, while more cumbersome mathematically, is not qualitatively diﬀerent.
17Proposition 2 For any given diﬀerence Rh − Rl > ¯ r, with ¯ r ﬁnite and positive, there exists a
¯ q(p) such that risky contract dominates the bank-run-proof contract when q>¯ q(p)( q<¯ q(p)) and
∂¯ q
∂p < 0.
Therefore, the higher p,t h el o w e r¯ q, and hence, the larger the interval of q where the contract
is risky. An increase in the liquidity of bank assets generated, for example, by an increase in the
size of the secondary market would, ceteris paribus, lead the bank to oﬀer more risky contracts
and increase the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper considered how a higher level of vulnerability to banking crises may be acceptable
in fast developing countries, especially where eﬃcient secondary ﬁnancial markets can reduce
liquidation costs. However, we also found that external interventions are desirable. Both a bail-
out policy (when a banking crisis is already under way) and a deposit insurance scheme (to
prevent bank runs altogether) are welfare increasing, despite the fact that they may make the
banking system more fragile. When a bail-out is expected, banks become more vulnerable to
negative shocks. Similarly, a deposit insurance scheme makes the system more dependent on
central intervention.27 Therefore, provided that a deposit-insurance policy or a bail-out policy
can be put in place at no cost, our model shows that the advantage in terms of better insurance
outweighs the costs deriving from the subsequent higher level of fragility.
Furthermore, our model highlights an important diﬀerence between the bail-out and deposit
insurance. As a bail-out does not avoid the run to the counter, it introduces an element of
ineﬃciency. In the case of a run, individuals still face an uninsurable cost of arriving late at the
counter even when there is a bail-out. This risk is absent under an eﬀective deposit insurance
scheme. This may explain why most banking crises never resulted in actual runs in our fairly
extensive banking-crisis data taken from Caprio and Kingebiel (1999) and Lingren, Gillian, and
Saal (1996).
27This last point is empirically supported by Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who ﬁn das t r o n gp o s i t i v e
eﬀect from deposit insurance on the probability of a crisis.
18AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proof for proposition 1






















































































Let c1a be the solution of (15˙ ). For simplicity, we split the proof into two parts.




such that, for r > r
¯
> 0, (12)i sb i n d i n gf o rq >q
¯
> 0.
Recall that Rh = Rl + r from equation (15) and condition (1), as well as the implicit function
theorem for Rl > 1, ∂c1a
∂r > 0 and ∂c1a
∂q > 0,w i t hlimr→∞ c1a(q,r)=∞ if q>0. Thus, when r =0 ,
constraint (12) is not binding. This is true since (15) implies c1a < 2(1− 1
2c1a)Rl or c1a < ¯ c.G i v e n
an r
¯
suﬃciently large, we can deﬁne a function q(r
¯





Rl+1 with q0(r) < 0.
For q>q (r
¯





such that (16) is binding for q> q
¯
.
2) We prove that for r>r
¯
, there exists a ¯ q such that V br(q,r) >Vrp(q,r) if and only if q>¯ q.




, where (12) is binding. The corner solution
















and exists only if ˆ c>¯ c and for a suﬃciently high q,s a yq > ˆ q.28 In this interval of q,w ed e ﬁne















































The ﬁrst term in the RHS of (18) is strictly negative. This is true since u(¯ c) >u (1
2ˆ c+1
22(1 − 1











is increasing in c ≤ ˆ c because u0(ˆ c) >R hu0 ¡
2(1 − 1
2ˆ c)Rh¢
. The last point

















since ¯ c<ˆ c.




Moreover, we note DV is continuous for q > ˆ q, and for q =1DV > 0. Given these observa-
tions, we argue that:
• If q<ˆ q,s o l u t i o n ˆ c does not exist.
• A bank-run-proof contract is the only feasible arrangement if there exists a ¯ q :ˆ q ≤ ¯ q<1
such that for q > ¯ qD V>0, i.e. a risky contract is preferred. For q<¯ q, the bank-run-proof
contract is either preferred or the only feasible arrangement.
A.2 Proof for proposition 2




















28For q =1 , the two problems are equivalent. We see this in the case c1a >
2Rl
Rl+1.
20and exists for ˆ c> 2Rl
Rl+1, i.e. for a suﬃciently high q ,s a yq > ˆ q(p).M o r e o v e r , s i n c e∂ˆ c
∂p > 0,
∂ˆ q(p)




















































Using the same reasoning, we argue that this is deﬁn e di nt h ei n t e r v a lq>ˆ q(p) with
∂DVp
∂q > 0
and DV > 0 for q =1 . M o r e o v e r ,w en o t et h a t
DVp
p > 0, since the cost of the bank run is
now lower. Deﬁning ¯ q(p):DVp(¯ q,r,p)=0 , we can argue
∂¯ q(p)
∂p < 0.Therefore, there exists a
¯ q(p) > ˆ q(p) such that the risky contract is preferred when q>¯ q(p).F o r q<¯ q(p), it is either
dominated or not feasible.
A.3 Data
Countries in the sample
Algeria, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colom-
bia, Comoros, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gam-
bia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lux-
embourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
List of Banking Crises
1990-96, Bangladesh- 1988-93, Burkina Faso- 1987-92, Cameroon-1995-99, Cameroon-1993-98, Cape
Verde- 1988-99, Central African Republic- 1979-92, Chad- 1992-99, Congo, Rep.- 1987-98, Costa Rica-
1988-91, Cote d’Ivoire- 1996-1999, Ecuador- 1989, El Salvador- 1991-94, Finland- 1982-99, Ghana- 1993,
Guinea- 1995-97, Guinea-Bissau- 1992-94, Indonesia- 1998-99, Indonesia- 1990-93, Italy- 1994-99, Jamaica-
1992-99, Japan- 1985-91, Kenya- 1997-99, Korea, Rep.-1985-88, Malaysia- 1997-99, Malaysia- 1987-88,
Mali- 1984-91, Mauritania- 1994-99, Mexico- 1988-91, Nepal- 1983-90, Niger- 1990-95, Nigeria- 1987-93,
Norway- 1988-89, Panama- 1989-99, Papua New Guinea- 1995-99, Paraguay- 1998-99, Philippines- 1981-91,
21Philippines- 1983-91, Senegal- 1990-99, Sierra Leone- 1988-93 Sri Lanka- 1995, Swaziland- 1991-94, Sweden-
1984-87, Thailand- 1997-99, Thailand- 1993, Togo- 1982-93 Trinidad and Tobago- 1990-98, Uganda- 1981-
83, Uruguay- 1993-99, Venezuela- 1996, Zambia- 1995-99 Zimbabwe.
Observations with R(3)i,t =1
Bahamas, 1981- Botswana,1981-92- Cameroon, 1986-87- Congo, Rep.,1983- Cyprus, 1981- Dominica,
1985- Egypt, 1984-86- Guyana,1996-98- Iceland, 1981- Indonesia, 1991-97- Ireland, 1999- Korea, Rep. 1986-
97- Malaysia, 1981-97- Malta, 1981-82- Malta, 1992-98- Mauritius 1990-99- Oman, 1986- Portugal, 1991-92-
Singapore, 1981-82- Singapore,1992-98- Sri Lanka, 1982- Thailand 1989- 97.
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